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Japan's New Economic 
Policies in East Asia: 
How It Looks from Australia 
Administered by the Center on Japanese Economy and Business at Columbia Business 
School, the Japan Distinguished Business Leaders Lecture Series brings Japanese and 
American business executives, government officials and scholars to Columbia to speak on 
topics concerning the Japanese economy and its business systems and the U.S.-Japan 
economic relationship. On November 9, 2000, the program featured Professor Peter 
Drysdale. This report is a summary of his presentation. 
EAST ASIA'S INTERESTS IN APEC 
T here are a number of developments in Japan's policy approaches towards East Asia that have the potential to affect profoundly the structure of interests within 
East Asia and the Pacific and between East Asia and the rest of the wor ld over the 
coming years. There is interest in a new regionalism in East Asia, different f rom the 
approach to regional cooperation ordered around the APEC process, that has domi-
nated policy thinking in East Asia, including that in Australia and New Zealand, over 
the past few decades. T h e message here is that there remains a great deal of confu-
sion in policy thinking in the region, especially about how to relate proposals for new 
regional arrangements to the East Asia's longstanding interest in open regionalism 
and the multilateral system. There are real questions about how the new regionalism 
in East Asia wil l evolve and whether some of the proposals for sub-regional arrange-
ments can ever be implemented in the way that is currently been advocated. 
T h e core objectives of APEC remain important and, despite the dramatic turn of 
events in East Asia through 1997 and 1998, the APEC process continues to provide an 
effective framework for achieving the ambitions of APEC members for cooperation in 
the tasks of modernisation and development in East Asia. Yet the new East Asian 
regionalism potentially challenges this conception of regional interests and it is not 
yet clear whether it will come to support or corrode the foundations of open regional-
ism in East Asia and the Pacific. 
The foundations for APEC were laid over a long period of t ime. Before the first 
ministerial meetings of APEC in the late 1980s, Australian and Japanese economists 
worked closely together on thinking about both countries interests in the regional and 
global economy and an appropriate regional framework for achieving those interests. 
East Asia's economic and polit ical ambit ions are ordered critically around the 
goal of modernisat ion. Trade liberalisation and reform are the leading instruments 
of East Asia's industrial t ransformation through the deeper access they provide to 
international markets and capital. As 'catching up' economies. East Asian countries 
have had a profound and strategic interest in a trade regime that eschews discr imi-
nation in trade treatment because a central feature of their trade growth involves 
taking over market share f rom established suppliers to international markets, init ial-
ly for labour-intensive goods and later for an increasingly sophisticated range of 
industrial products . 
Since the beginning of modernisation in East Asia, wi th the exception of the impe-
rial period and World War II, Japan sought equal treatment wi th the industrial pow-
ers. That was the driving idea behind Japan's international trade and economic diplo-
macy until the imperial period. After the Pacific War, that idea was reinforced with the 
establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Japan's 
accession to GATT, under the auspices of the United States. It was the United States 
that first extended most favoured nation (mfn) treatment to Japan after WWII and, in 
1956, saw that Japan successfully entered the GATT. 
In 1957, Australia was the second country in the wor ld to extend mfn, or non-dis 
criminatory treatment in trade policy, towards Japan, under the Agreement on 
Commerce signed in that year. The foundations for Australia's new approach to 
Japan were laid when Australia committed to the Mutual Aid Agreement with the 
United States in the middle of the Pacific War. That Agreement delivered the Pacific 
fleet to the Coral Sea and the defense of the South Pacific, and other military support 
to Australia. In return, Australia undertook, after the War, to adopt the most favoured 
nation principle in international trade and apply it to both victor and vanquished alike. 
The San Francisco Peace Treaty confirmed that Australia would, in due course, apply 
mfn treatment in trade towards Japan. 
All the East Asian economies have similar interests in international trade diploma 
cy, since as catching up economies in the international economy, they have a power-
ful interest in a non-discriminatory trading system — as new entrants face discrimina-
t ion in the international marketplace. Without rules that assert the principle of non-
discrimination in international trade policy, East Asian economies face obstacles in 
expanding exports and achieving their ambit ions for modernisation through deeper 
integration into the international economy, 
A U S T R A L I A ' S T R A D E P O L I C Y I N T E R E S T S 
Australia has a direct interest in the multilateral system because of its global com-
.rfimodity trading interests. But it also has a very important indirect strategic inter-
est in a non discriminatory trading system because its economy is so closely tied to 
the fortunes of the East Asian economies in the global marketplace. The success of 
the Australian economy in the postwar period has been driven by its integration into 
the East Asian economy. 
A second and related reason for East Asian's interest in the multilateral system, 
and open regionalism which sought to protect those interests, was the global spread 
of its trading interests. Unlike Europe, or even North America, East Asia's external 
trade and other economic transactions arc much more broadly spread across the 
three main centres of wor ld trade and economic activity — in East Asia itself, in North 
America, and in Europe. East Asian intra-regional trade has been growing steadily but 
the geographical spread of East Asia's trading interests remains global. 
This is why the organising idea for APEC was open regionalism and why APEC has 
sought to promote trade liberalisation on a non-discriminatory, multilateral basis. 
Yet APEC is not simply a trading arrangement, although defense of an open trad-
ing system is the most important shared interest of Asia Pacific economies. The Asia 
Pacific is a vast zone of economic development. Hence, economic and technical coop-
eration focussed on market strengthening in the course of economic transformation, 
are essential complements to APEC's trade policy agenda. 
While APEC's foundations were economic — successful East Asian economic 
growth and the development of East Asia's role in the international economy — t h e 
political objective was to accommodate East Asia's growing power wi thout disturbing 
the balancing role played by North America in regional economic and political affairs. 
There was a happy coincidence of economic and political interests, encouraging 
regionalism based on a distinctly global agenda, at the end of the Cold War. 
East Asian arrangements were ordered around this APEC process. APEC is not an 
institutional arrangement. It is not ordered within a formal agreement among the par-
ticipating countries. When APEC was established, its priority was to give strength to 
the multilateral trading system, then wi th in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, 
and to extend confidence and coalit ion-building in terms of policy priorities among 
the participating economies. Countries come to APEC as independent members to 
discuss interests and objectives, and to try and form common approaches to trade 
policy, and other economic policy issues in the region. 
Some of APEC's important objectives must be delivered through hard negotia-
tions wi th in the WTO. One important interest in APEC was to encourage a frame-
work of cooperation wi th in the region that would build confidence In unilateral 
action that supported the liberalisation of trade and deeper integration into the inter-
national marketplace. 
CHALLENGE TO APEC 
There have been a number of important challenges to APEC's interests over the 
I last few years. One proximate challenge was the East Asian crisis and the huge 
shock it wrought on the troubled economies of East Asia. Before the crisis, APEC had 
been focused primarily on trade and investment issues, not financial cooperation. A 
theater within which to mobil ise support to supplement the intervention of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was non-existent in the APEC process. In response 
to the crisis some suggested that the region needed to establish an Asian Monetary 
Fund, but that was rejected in Washington. As a result, the region felt very alone in 
managing the crisis. The United States did sanction supplementary support for Korea 
because of the important political and strategic interests that the United States had 
there. But in Thailand, the United States did not provide supplementary lines of sup-
port, unlike Japan and Australia. This left a tremendous bitterness in Southeast Asia 
about Washington's neglect. 
APEC did respond to the crisis in 1997 by initiating the Manila Framework Group 
(MFG). The MFG is comprised of representatives f rom the East Asian, Australasian 
and North American finance ministries and central banks. This group provides a 
regional architecture for monitor ing, surveillance and potentially a framework for a 
more coherent response to the appearance of problems similar to those that emerged 
during the East Asian crisis. 
Nevertheless, the East Asian crisis significantly affected the policy mood in East 
Asia and left East Asian economies much less certain about what they could rely 
upon across the Pacific in t imes of trouble. 
A second proximate cause of the shift away from the old conception of regional 
cooperation in East Asia was the setback at the WTO ministerial meetings in Seattle in 
November 1999. Progress within the WTO is central to progress in the APEC process. 
The failure to launch a new round of negotiations at the WTO meetings meant there 
was a significant setback to progress with open regionalism within APEC. 
A third challenge is the long-term structural shift in economic power among East 
Asian countries. The growth and success of East Asian economies and their integra-
t ion into the international economy means that they now constitute around one quar-
ter of wor ld output and a growing share of wor ld trade. This growth in their impor-
tance in the wor ld economy has been accompanied by an increase in trade and 
investment transactions among East Asian countries Themselves. 
CHANGE IN POLICY MOOD 
Despite the fact that the most important market for many of these economies, including Japan, is still the United States, and despite the fact that there is wide 
diversification of East Asia's trade and other economic transactions in the global 
economy, there is an increased sense that East Asia requires a new framework for 
cooperation on regional issues within East Asia itself. 
Important parts of the Japanese policy making elite are now seeking greater recog-
nition of a Japanese leadership role: Japan made by far the largest contribution to the 
financing of recovery f rom the East Asian crisis but received little recognition for it, 
and the Japanese suggestion of an Asian Monetary Fund was brushed aside by 
Washington. China emerged from the crisis more self confident about its role in the 
regional and global economies, and with greater standing in East Asia. 
This is important background to a more complex and challenging environment for 
regional economic cooperation. The East Asian crisis did not lead to a retreat into 
protectionism: on balance, East Asia is as open to trade and more open to direct for-
eign investment than before the crisis. It is a bit less open to short-term capital f lows, 
but at no large economic loss. There is, however, reduced momentum in new unilat-
eral trade liberalisation and less faith that the WTO and APEC wil l be vehicles for con-
tinuing trade liberalisation. 
At the same t ime, there has been a proliferation of proposals tor sub-regional trade 
arrangements that would see important APEC members shift trade policy priority to 
negotiations of 'free trade' agreements of a potentially discriminatory nature. Apart 
f rom Japan-Korea, Japan-Korea-Taiwan, AFTA-CER, Japan-Mexico, Japan-Canada, 
Korea-Chile, NAFTA-Chile, Singapore-Japan, and Singapore-New Zealand are among 
those that have been mooted. For Japan, the only major economy in the wor ld other 
than China and Korea not a member of any free trade agreement of economic union, 
to choose a strategy of closed regionalism would have considered reverberations 
within East Asia and the Pacific and with in the wor ld trading system and mark an his-
toric turning point in its economic diplomacy. Only during the imperial period has 
Japan chosen this course. The failure of Seattle has been used to lend legitimacy to 
this shift in the direction of trade policy thinking . 
There is now more fluidity in foreign economic policy in East Asia and the Pacific 
then there has been for a very long t ime. The various proposals emanating f rom 
Japan on sub-regional trade policy have shaken the foundations of established con-
ceptions of East Asia's interests in the wor ld economy and the reliability of Japan's 
support for the mult i lateral system. The f luidity is accompanied by a confusion in 
policy thinking — particularly about how to relate the proposals for sub-regional trade 
arrangements to broader arrangements in APEC and to the multilateral system. 
Almost accidentally Japan appears to be re-orienting its approach to international 
trade policy away f rom a central focus on the most favoured nation principle towards 
negotiating preferential arrangements with a number of countries in the East Asian 
region. Korea was first on the list. The historic reconciliation between Japan and 
Korea in December 1998 on the occasion of President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Tokyo 
saw commi tment to the study of the proposal for a free trade arrangement between 
the two countries. The more modest proposal of a free trade arrangement between 
Japan and Singapore has more chance of successful negotiation. But even in the case 
of Singapore, the agricultural lobby in Japan has objected to a comprehensive (WTO 
consistent) arrangement because of the treat of goldfish and sugar cane imports . 
How do these new developments in thinking in Japan and elsewhere in East Asia 
relate to the established framework for cooperation in Asia and the Pacific under the 
umbrella of APEC? There are many question marks. The question marks were already 
there wi th respect to the limits of open regionalism in terms of the negotiations that 
had to be carried through the WTO; they have now been underlined through the set-
back in Seattle. 
How wi l l APEC relate to these sub-regional trade initiatives and arrangements that 
have been suggested, such as the Singapore-Japan deal? What discipline can be 
injected wi th in APEC to maintain the overriding objective of APEC and keep regional 
cooperation directed towards open regionalism? The outcome wil l depend on policy 
developments in a number of places, but especially the United States. 
The regional architecture for financial cooperation is another problem that was 
exposed by developments over the last few years in East Asia. One result of the 
uncertainties created by the East Asian crisis and international political developments 
was the initiative to establish the ASEAN + 3 group of the ASEAN countries plus 
Korea, Japan and China. To date, ASEAN + 3 has involved consultation on policy of 
the broadest kind among the political leaders and economic ministers. However, in 
the couple of years since its establishment, ASEAN + 3 has gone a long way in 
cementing the idea of a new East Asian cooperative framework. 
Australia is very interested in being involved in ASEAN + 3 because its fortunes 
depend so heavily on the regional economy. Yet at this t ime, it is difficult diplomati-
cally for Australia to be involved in ASEAN + 3 because of its problems wi th 
Malaysia, and also in its regional dealings with Indonesia. The aftermath of the 
Indonesian financial crisis and political transformation and Australia's role in the man-
agement of the East Timor crisis have left a sour taste in relations between Australia 
and Indonesia, traditionally closely aligned in regional affairs. 
Is APEC up to the job? How can APEC deliver on some of the interests in regional 
cooperation that are important to East Asia? Questions about the adequacy of region-
al arrangements was put into stark relief around the East Asia financial crisis. The 
relationship between the IMF and the troubled economies was difficult, and the ques-
t ion of whether or not the new ASEAN + 3 architecture wil l evolve consistently wi th 
global arrangements is a real challenge that is yet to be resolved. 
WHERE TO JAPAN? 
Japan's financial problems over the last decade were made in Japan. During the East Asian financial crisis, Japan was not in the position to give decisive leader-
ship and advice for two reasons. First, the diplomatic legwork had not been done. 
Second, Tokyo was not the obvious place to come to for advice on financial recon-
struction in the mid 1990s. It was an embarrassing situation for Japan and when one 
is embarrassed there is an inclination to want to blame others for your problems. 
There is also a question about the effect of these developments in East Asia on 
leadership in the region. Given its economic and political importance and size, Japan 
naturally has pretensions to leadership in the region. ASEAN + 3 provides a vehicle 
for demonstrating leadership. China has also come to this arrangement wi th enthusi-
asm. This was a deeply political decision, much more than an economic policy strate-
gy. China's interest in ASEAN + 3 was encouraged by the Belgrade bombing and the 
Co Report as an insurance against continuing problems in the China-US relationship. 
China may still be a developing economy, but it is already a big power. It is also the 
fourth largest trading country in the wor ld. Yet as a big economy, it is difficult to l imit 
its economic and diplomatic interests as well as its political relationships to a small 
neighbourhood group of countries. Even between Japan and China there are asym-
metries which are better handled wi th in a wider frame of cooperation that encom-
passes, for example, the United States, China and Japan, the rest of Asia and Russia, 
such as that provided in APEC. 
The direction of Japan's new trade and financial strategies is related to the ques-
t ion of leadership and poses challenges for China in the evolution of the regional 
structure of economic power in the future. 
C H I N A ' S CHOICE 
What are East Asia's strategic interests? Who is fo l lowing whom? Where are the 
leaders leading and in what direction are they trying to lead? The answers to 
these questions are still not clear. How China seeks to influence the shape of regional 
arrangements in a way that is consistent w i th the broader regional architecture and 
interests in the global architecture wi l l be a very important factor in determining the 
ultimate outcome of cooperative arrangements in East Asia and across the Pacific. 
China has not been considered as a member of any sub-regional trade arrange-
mento for good reason. The WTO and APEC f ramework and its core agenda of 
open regional ism remain crucial to successful management of evolving relation-
ships between China and other major powers in Asia and the Pacific, including the 
United States. 
China's best choice remains the global choice and a regional framework, which is 
structured like APEC to deliver on global objectives despite the political dynamics of 
ASEAN + 3. That is also why China's accession to the WTO is so important. That is 
why China's hosting of the APEC Summit in Shanghai in 2001 wi l l be so important — 
as a platform for articulating its approach to these regional and global developments. 
Yet for China too, as for Japan, ASEAN + 3 creates leverage in trans-Pacific dealings. 
REVIEW 
The new circumstances in foreign economic diplomacy in East Asia have led some commentators to announce a fundamental re-direction of East Asia's foreign eco-
nomic policy strategy. They at once overestimate, and underestimate, the policy pro-
nouncements and initiatives that have occurred over the past year. 
The negotiations on a Japan - Singapore free trade area are still under way and 
the impact of a positive outcome on the regional policy regime is problematic. The 
study of a Korea - Japan free trade arrangement is at this point simply that, a study, 
and its realisation is challenged by developments on the Korean peninsula and the 
position of China. The consu ltation in ASEAN + 3 and the shape of financial and trade 
cooperation through that arrangement is yet to be defined. There is no question that 
there has been a significant change in policy mood but all these developments may, 
or may not, impact unfavourably on the broader APEC regional agenda. 
None of these developments recommends a re-direction of the region's core trade 
policy strategies and the overriding importance that East Asia must continue to 
assign to mu ltilateral and global arrangements. If there is to be change, there is yet to 
be careful, hard-edged analytic and empirical argument to explain why — economi-
cally or in terms of regional foreign policy interests — both wi th in the region and to 
players outside, like the United States, who wi l l have an important stake in the shape 
of any new regional arrangements as they emerge, 
Question: Some people believe that APEC was a vehicle for moderating and medi-
ating the U.S.-Japan economic relationship, and it sounds to me as if you ' re now say-
ing that perhaps APEC is going to be a vehicle for moderating and mediating China-
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